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STATE~fENT OF FACTR 
This is an appeal frmn the Judg1nents of the lower 
court in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendant~ 
in the above-entitled cases eli1ninating and excluding 
from Central Weber Sewer I1nprove1nent District rrr-
tain properties located within the District. Upon stipu-
lation of counsel this Court ordered all t hr casrs con-
solidated for purposes of appeal. 
Briefly the facts are as follows: On or about ~larch 
3, 1953, the Board of County Comn1issioners of Weber 
County adopted a resolution creating the Sewer District 
and defined the boundaries of the District. The reso-
lution was as follows: 
""RESOLUTION 
"WHEREAS. pursuant to authority made and pro-
vided in Chapter 24, Laws of Utah, 1949, as mnenderl 
by Chapter 32, Laws of Utah, 1951, the Board of Com-
Inissioners of Weber County, Utah, has resolved that 
the public health, convenience, and necessity require 
the creation of a sewer i1nprovement distrirt for the 
area hereinafter described, anrl 
""WHEREAS; the Board of Com1nissioners of Weber 
County has given notice of its intention to establish 
such a district, which notice, in conformance with the 
laws of the State of Utah, was duly published in the 
Ogden Standard-Examiner newspaper, a paper of gen-
eral circulation in Weber County, once each week for 
five successive weeks, and 
"WHEREAS, in said notice a time and place were 
designed (sic) at which all interested parties could ap-
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pear before said Board of County Commissioners and be 
heard in support of or in opposition to the creation of 
~aid district, and 
"WHER:illAS, said hearing was had by the Board 
of Commissioners of WehPr County on the 25th day 
of February, 1953, at the time and place designated in 
said notice, and all written protests that had been filed 
as required by law and all that were presented up to 
the adjournment of said hearing being received, and. 
there having been eleven protests in all presented in 
opposition to the establishment of the district, and 
''WHEREAS, the officials who prepared the last 
a~f-'essment roll for Weber County segregated and 
rertified to this Board the assessed valuation of the 
real propPrty appearing on the roll which lies within 
the proposed houndariPs of this district, and it being 
clear that the protests filed represent far less than 
25% of the assessed valuation of the real property in the 
distriet, and that the written protests filed are signed 
h~· far less than 25% in number of the real property 
owners \vithin the proposed district, according to the 
last assessment roll for rounty taxes cornpleted prior 
to the publishing of the notir<> of hearing, and 
"WHER~JAS, the Weher County SurvPyor has 
checked and reported that the boundaries of the pro-
pose<l distriet are aecurate as sPt forth below and in 
the notice of hearing, and it appearing to the Board 
that all property· originally included in the proposed 
district, as set out in the notice of intention to establish 
the district, will he dirPdly benefited h~· the proposed 
improvements and should hP included within said dis-
trict, and 
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"WHEREAS, it appears to the Board of Commis-
sioners of Weber County that this district should he 
established immediately under the na1ne of tlH• Central 
W eher Sewer In1prove1nent District, 
"NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT, AND IT HEREBY 
IS RESOLVED by the Board of Cmn1nissioners of 
Weher County, Utah, as follows: 
"1. That a sewer improvmnent district, to be kno\vn 
and identified as the 'Central Weber Sewer Improve-
Inent District', shall he, and it is hereh~· rstahlislwd 
and rrea ted. 
"2. That the boundaries of said distrirt are definr(l 
as follows, and all area and property lying within 
these described bounds is now within and henceforth 
a part of this sewer district: 
(Here follows a description hy rnetes and 
bounds of the area encompassed within the Dis-
trict.) 
"3. That at the hearing held hy the Board of Com-
nlissioners of Weber County on the 25th day of Feb-
ruary, 1953, at the time and place designated in the 
notice published in confor1nance with the laws of the 
State of Utah, setting- forth the intention to establish 
a sewer district, only eleven protests by number against 
the establishment of said sewer district were filed with 
the County Clerk and received hy the Board of Com-
Inissioners of Weber County, and it is hereby deter-
mined that the protests filed and presented represent 
far less than 25% of the assessed valuation of the real 
property in the district, and the said protests are signed 
hy far less than 25% in number of the real property 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
owners within the proposed district, according to the 
last assessment roll for county taxes completed prior 
to the publication of the notice of hearing. 
"4. That the boundaries of the proposed district, 
as set forth above, are accurate and that all property 
originally included in the proposed district, as set out 
in the notice of intention to establish the district, it 
being the same property as described above, will be 
directly benefited by the proposed improvements, and 
all of this property should be included within said 
district and none should be eliminated. 
";). rrhat it appears that the Board of Trustees of 
this improvement district should be comprised of ap-
proximately seven members, and it is recommended by 
the Board of Commissioners of Weber County that if 
the n1e1nhers of the Board of Trustees were appointed 
in the following manner, it would 1nake an excellent 
working organization: One each to he designated and 
appointed h:' the ::\la~·01, with the consent and approval 
of the governing body of the municipalities of the City 
of ~ orth Ogden, the City of South Ogden, and the City 
of Riverdale, and two each to be designated and ap-
pointed l>y the Chairman of the County Commission 
and the ~iayor of Ogden City, with the consent and 
approval of the governing bodies of said Ogden City 
and Weber ( 1 ount~·. 
"6. That the public health and safety make it 
mandatory that this resolution become effective im-
mediately upen signing. 
''RESOLVED, ()RDERED AND ADOPTED by the 
Board of Commissioners of Weber County, State of 
lTtah, this 3rd day of Marel1, l~l:l:--1. 
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Cmnmissioner Lyn1an l\L Hess voting ay<' 
Commissioner Arthur P. Brown voting ay<' 
Commissioner Ehner Carver voting aye 
/s/ Lyman M. Hess 
Ly1nan l\[. Hess, Chainnan of the 
Board of County Commissioners 
of vVelwr County, State of Utah. 
"ATTEST: 
/s/ Lawrence l\I. l\Ialan 
Lawrence l\L Malan 
Weber County Clerk 
"STATE OF UTAH } 
County of Weber 
ss. 
"I, LAWRENCE ~L l\IALAN, County Clerk and 
Ex-Officio Clerk of the Board of County Com1nissioners 
of Weber County, State of Utah, do hereby c·ertify that 
the above and foregoing resolution was passed hy the 
Board of County Commissioners of said County at the 
regular meeting held l\Iarch 3, 1953 ; I further certify 
that upon passing of the resolution, Commissioners 
Hess, Brown, and Carver voted aye. 
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand 
and official seal at my office in the County of Weber, 
State of Utah, this lOth day of :March, 1953. 
(SEAL) 
/s/ Lawrence l\I. :Malan 
Lawrence M. l\falan 
County Clerk and Ex-Officio Clerk 
of the Board of Commission·ers 
of Weber Count~·." (Italics ours.) 
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All the area and property lying within the described 
boundaries were declared to be a part of the District. 
Prior to the adoption of said resolution, each of the 
respondents herein filed a protest and petition with 
the Board of Commissioners alleging that certain of 
the property, real and personal, classified for assess-
ment purposes h.v the State Tax Commission of Utah 
would not be directly benefited in any manner by the 
establishment of the District. A hearing was had hy 
the Board of Count:· Commissioners on February 25, 
1953, after notice duly published, for the consideration 
of protests; and after consideration of the protests the 
Board found that all the property should be included 
within said District and none ~houlcl he eliminated. 
rrhe District was created pursuant to Chapter 24, 
Laws of Utah 1949, as amended by Chapter 32, Laws 
of Utah, 1951. 
Thereafter each of the respondents filed a com-
plaint and petition for review in the District Court of 
Weber County, and Writs of Review were duly issued 
hy the Court. The complaints and petitions did not 
attack the regularit:· of the proceedings of the Board 
of County Cmmnissioners. Appellants filed Motions 
to Dismiss (or if said l\[otions were denied) Demands 
for l\[ore Definite Statement and ::\lotions to Strike. The 
~Lotions were denied hy the Court. Appellants then 
filed their Answers and issue was joined thereon. Prior 
to the trial, appellants filed Motions for Judgment on 
the Pleadings whif·h J\1 otions were also denied by the 
Court. ( ~ounsel for the respective parties in each case 
then stipulated in writing certain facts which were made 
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a part of the record in each case, subject to appellants' 
reservation of objections as hereinafter appears in the 
stipulation. Upon the case being called for trial before 
the Court without a jury, objection was made hy appel-
lants to the introduction of any evidence, and objection 
was made to the introduction of any evidence included 
within the stipulation of fact~. The Court reserved 
ruling on those objections pending the filing of briefs 
and the oral argu1nents of counsel. The cases were 
then submitted to the Court for decision based solely 
upon said stipulations, the exhibits and the records. No 
other testilnony was offered or received by the Cou:r:t. 
Written briefs were filed by each of the parties and 
the matter argued. 
On or about the 27th day of February, 1954, the 
Court entered the following: 
1. Order overruling objection to the introduction 
of any evidence and objection to the introduct-
ion of evidence included within stipulation of 
facts; 
2. Order denying 1notion for judgment on the 
pleadings; 
3. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; 
and 
4. Judgment. 
The following paragraphs were offered as stipu-
lated facts, if admissible at all, in each of the six cases, 
and are common to each: 
"Between counsel for the parties in the above 
entitled action, it is hereby stipulated and agreed 
as follows: 
"1. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 
numbered 2 hereof, the facts set forth in this 
10 
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stipulation shall he made a part of the record in 
this case in all respects as though such facts 
were proved by witnesses sworn and testifying 
in open court. 
"2. This stipulation shall be without pre-
judice to the right of defendants to object to 
the materiality of any fact set forth in para-
, graphs numbers 3, 4 and 5 hereof or the relevancy 
of any such fact to any issue involved in this 
case, and defendants expressly reserve the right 
to interpose any such objection at the time this 
stipulation is offered and tendered for filing in 
this case. 
"* * ':. 
"4. If the house journal for the Twenty-Ninth 
Regular Session of the Legislature of the State 
of Utah (1951 Regular Session) were introduced 
in this case, such journal would show that when 
senate bill No. 22 was introduced, said bill pro-
vided for the elimination from any district pro-
posed thereunder of property originally included 
therein, but which the county commissioners 
should determine would not be benefited by the 
proposed improvements. Said journal would 
further show that said senate bill No. 22 was later 
amended to provide for the elimination from any 
such district of property included therein, but 
1rhich the county commissioner shall determine 
would not be directly benefitrrl by the prozwsed 
improvements. 
"5. If a witness or witnesses were called and 
sworn hy the parties hereto, such witness or wit-
nesses would testify that the nature and extent of 
the i lllprovements proposed by the defendants and 
respondents are the construction of a sanitary 
sewer system consisting of sewage outfall lines, 
11 
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sewage interceptor and trunk collertion line~, sew-
age treatment plants and related facilities and 
appurtenances for the collection, treatment and 
disposition of sewage within the district. 
"6. If a witness or witnesses were called hy 
defendants and sworn herein, that such witness 
or witnesses would testify that the creation of the 
proposed district and the construction, operation 
and maintenance of the sewage facilities pro-
posed would be for the general benefit of the area 
included within the lilnits of said district." (ltali<'~ 
ours.) 
The only 1naterial differences in these stipulation~ 
in the various cases wer0 the descriptions of the several 
properties sought to he excluded hy the several respond-
ents and the descriptions of the properties admittedly 
included within the District. 
For the convenience of the Court we are setting out 
below the several statements of agreed facts, if admis-
sible at all, as they were set forth in the stipulations in 
each case, to show those differences as between the claims 
of the several respondents: 
No. 8171. 11he Denver and Rio Grande Western Rail-
road Co. case : 
"3. If W. S. Speckn1an were called by plain-
tiff and sworn in this rase, he would testify as 
follows: 
"' (a) The Denver and Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Con1pany, plaintiff above named, on the 
date hereof has, located within the limits of 
Central Weber Sewer Improvement District, or 
th'ere is apportioned to said district for assess-
ment and taxation purposes, the following prop-
erty, to wit: 
12 
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'• ( 1) Trackage 
3.69 miles first main line, including 
100 foot right of way. 
13.06 miles yard and industry tracks, 
exclusive of any land . 
. 58 miles sugar works spur, exclusive 
of any land. 
"(2) 17.95 miles of telephone, telegraph, and 
transmission line~. 
" ( 3) Rolling stock, consisting of locomotives 
and cars, apportioned on a hasis of 
17.33 miles. 
"( 4) Real estate outside right of way con-
sisting of 48.14 acres of land. 
" ( 5) Improvements and personal property 
located upon or affixed to the land des-
ignated in the above sub-paragraph (4). 
" ( 6) Personal property, consisting of Ina-
rhinery and tools not located upon or 
affixed to the land designated in the 
above sub-paragraph (4). 
·• (b) Plaintiff, The Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company, does not seek to have 
excluded from said district said 48.14 acres of 
land nor the improvements or personal property 
located thereon. Plaintiff seeks to have excluded 
from said district all of the other property above 
described. 
" (c) None of the property of plaintiff, The 
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad des-
ignated in sub-paragraphs numbered (1), (2), (3) 
and (6) and sought to be excluded from said dis-
trict in this action is presently physically con-
nected to any sewage facilitie~, and 1n the con-
13 
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duct of plaintiff's railroad operations, it is not 
desirable or feasible to make a physical connec-
tion of any such property to any sewage facilities. 
In the ordinary and regular operation of the 
railroad transportation business the rights of 
way, rolling stock and other equipment are used 
in connection and in conjunction with the prop-
erty which plaintiff concedes 1nay ren1ain within 
the district." 
No. 8172. The l\fountain States Telephone and Telegraph 
Co. case: 
"3. If W. H. Morton were called hy plaintiff 
and sworn in this case, he would testify as follows: 
"(a) The Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company, plaintiff above named, on 
the date hereof has, located within the lilnits of 
Central Weber Sewer Improvement District, or 
there is apportioned to said district for assess-
ment and taxation purposes, the following prop-
erty, to wit: 
" ( 1) 6224 telephone poles. 
"(2) 18 miles of copper wire. 
616 miles of iron wire. 
"(3) 943,766 feet of cable. 
172.707 feet of single duct conduit. 
" ( 4) 3 parcels of land and buildings thereon. 
" ( 5) personal property, consisting of switch-
boards, materials and supplies, furni-
ture and fixtures, and toll terminal 
equipment, located within the buildings 
on the premises designated in sub-para-
graph ( 4) above. 
"(6) Personal property, consisting of private 
branch exchange equipment, teletype-
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
writers, tools and work equipment and 
1nobile radio telephone equipment lo-
cated outside the buildings on the pre-
mises designated in sub-paragraph ( 4) 
above. 
"(b) Plaintiff, The Mountain States Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company does not seek to 
have excluded from said district said three parcels 
of land and the buildings thereon. Plaintiff seeks 
to have excluded from said district all of the 
other property above described. 
" (c) None of the property of plaintiff, Tlw 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany designated in sub-paragraphs numbered (1), 
(2), (3), (5) and (6) and sought to be excluderl 
from said rlistrict in this action is presently 
physically connected to any sewage facilities, and 
in the conduct of plaintiff's telephone operations, 
it is not desirable or feasible to make a physieal 
connection of any such property to any sewage 
facilities. In the ordinary and regular operation 
of the telephone communication business the poles, 
wires, cables, switchboards and other equipment 
are used in connection and in conjunetion with the 
property which plaintiff concedes may remain in 
the district. The property in sub-paragraph ( 5) 
described is located within buildings, which build-
ings are present]~· eonnerterl with sewage facil-
ities." 
Xo. 817:1. Utah Power & Light Co. Case: 
"3. If 0 .. J. Lowe were called by plaintiff and 
sworn in this case, he would testify as follows: 
"(a) 'rhe 1Ttah Power & Light Company, 
plaintiff a hove named, on the date hereof, has 
located within the limits of Central W'eber Sewer 
Improvement Distriet the fo1lowing property, the 
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inclusion of which in said District jt haR prote~tr•l 
and now protests, as classified for assess1nent anrl 
taxation purposes: 
" ( 1) Transmission lines 
Poles and pole structures, together with 
crossarms, insulators, attachn1ents and 
appurtenances, sectionalizing switch-
racks and overhead conductors and dev-
ices carrying voltage of 44,000 volts and 
over, and the easements therefor. 
"(2) Distribution lines 
Poles and pole structures, crossarms, in-
sulators, attachments, appurtenances, 
transformers, protective equipment such 
as lightning arresters and grounding 
devices, and overhead conductors and 
devices such as switches, voltage regu-
lators, capacitors and cutouts carrying 
voltage under 44,000 volts, and the ease-
Inents therefor. 
"(3) Substation improvements and equip-
ment 
Supporting structures, buses, switches 
(manual and motor operated), protect-
ive, control and measuring equipment, 
insulators, appurtenant attachments, 
transformers and other recognized sub-
station equipment. 
" ( 4) Power plant equipment and improve-
ments 
Electric generating equipment consist-
ing of turbines, generators, buses, 
switches (manual and motor operated), 
control equipment, protective equip-
ment and communication equipment. 
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" ( 5) Telephone lines 
Poles and pole structures, crossarms, 
insulators, attachments, appurtenances, 
and conductors for voice and signa] 
transmission, and the ease1nents there-
for. 
"(b) None of the property of plaintiff, Utah 
Power & Light Company, designated in sub-para-
graphs numbered 1 to 5, inclusive, and sought to 
he excluded from said District in this action, is 
presently physically connected to any sewage 
facility, except that s01ne of the property de-
scribed in sub-paragraph ( 4) above is located in 
buildings which have toilet installations and in 
the conduct of plaintiff's operations it i~ not 
desirable or feasible to make a physical connec-
tion of any such property to any sewage facilities. 
rehat in the ordinary and regular operation of 
plaintiff's business, the transmission and distri-
bution lines, substations and other equipment de-
scribed herein are used in connection and in con-
junction with the property which plaintiff con-
cedes may remain in the District. 
''7. That the picture attached hereto, 1narked 
Exhibit 1 and entitled 'Roy-Riverdale 130 kv 
reaps', shows a part of a typical transmission line 
such as plaintiff seeks to exclude from the Central 
Weber Sewer Improvement District; that tlw 
picture attached hereto, marked Exhibit 2 and en-
titled 'Typical12.5 kv Distribution Line on River-
dale Road', shows a part of a distribution line 
typical of those plaintiff seeks to exclude from 
said District; that the picture attached hereto, 
marked Exhibit 3 and entitled 'South Ogden Sub-
station,' shows a substation typical of those plain-
tiff seeks to Pxelude frmn said District; that the 
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pictures attached hereto, marked Exhibits ..J., 5, 6, 
7 and 8 and entitled 'Riverdale Plant 130 kv 
Transformer Bank', 'Roy-Riverdale 130 kv LinP 
Terminal Tower and Air Break Switches on Line 
No. 1', 'Generators-Riverdale Plant', 'Gener-
ator-Pioneer Plant' and 'Switchrack-Roy-
Riverdale 130 kv Nos. 1 and 2 at Riverdale Plant', 
show power plant equipment typical of that plain-
tiff seeks to exclude from the said District." 
No. 8174. Bamberger Railroad Cmnpany, et al case: 
"3. If H. L. Balser, were called h~· plaintiff, 
Bamberger Railroad Cmnpany, and sworn in this 
case, he would testify as follows: 
"(a) The Bamberger Railroad Co1npany, one 
of the plaintiffs above named, on the date hereof 
has locatPd within the limits of ~entral Weber 
Sewer Improvement District, or there is appor-
tioned to said District for assessment and taxa-
tion purposes, the following property, to-wit: 
"(1) Trackage 
4.92 miles mainline and appurtenances, 
including right of way varying be-
tween 66 and 100 feet in width, ex-
cepting approximately ____________ miles 
located within and upon public 
streets and highways. 
2.30 miles yard and industry tracks, PX-
clusive of any land. 
" ( 2) Rolling stock, consisting of locomotives 
and various types of cars, apportioned 
on a basis of 7.22 miles. 
"(3) Real estate outside of right of way. 
" ( 4) Improvements and personal property 
located upon or affixed to the land des-
ignated in the above subparagraph 3. 
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"(b) Plaintiff Bamberger Railroad Company 
does not seek to have excluded from said District 
said property designated in sub-paragraphs 3 and 
4. Plaintiff Bamberger Railroad Company seeks 
to have excluded from said District all of the 
other property above described in subparagraphs 
1 and 2. 
" (c) None of the property of plaintiff, Bam-
berger Railroad Company designated in subpara-
graphs 1 and 2, and sought to be excluded from 
said District in this action is presently physically 
connected to any sewage facilities, and in the con-
duct of plaintiff's railroad operations, it is not 
desirable or feasible to make a physical connection 
of any such property to any sewage facilities. 
That in the ordinary and regular operation of the 
railroad transportation business the rights of 
way, rolling stock and other equipment are used 
in connection and in conjunction with the property 
which plaintiff concedes 1nay remain within the 
District. 
"4. lf Dale W. Barratt were called by plain-
tiff, Bamberger Transportation Company, and 
sworn in this case, he would testify as follows: 
" (a) That Bamberger Transportation Com-
pany, one of the plaintiffs above named, on the 
date hereof has located within the limits of Cen-
tral Weber Sewer Improvement District, or there 
is apportioned to said District for assessment and 
taxation purposes hy the State Tax Commission 
of Utah, the following property, to-wit: 
~[otor Coaches. 
"(b) Plaintiff. Bamberger Transportation 
Company seeks to have excluded from said Dis-
trict, all of the property above described in para-
graph 4 (a)-. 
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" (c) None of the property of plaintiff Bam-
berger Transportation Cmnpany designated in 
paragraph 4 (a) and sought to be excluded from 
said District in this action, is presently phyl-lirally 
connected to any sewage facilities, and in the con-
duct of plaintiff Bamberger Transportation Com-
pany's bus transportation operation, it is not de-
sirable or feasible to make a physical connection 
of such property to any sewage facilities. That in 
the regular and ordinary operation of the hul-l 
transportation business the motor coaches are 
used in connection and in conjunction with prop-
erty which is not owned by plaintiff Bamberger 
Transportation Company, but is leased by the 
same, but in the opinion only of Bamberger 
Transportation Company is property of a type 
which might rernain within the Distrid." 
No. 8173. Southern Pacific Co., et al casr: 
"3. If F. B. Magruder were called by plain-
tiff, Southern Pacific Company, and sworn in this 
case he would testify as follows: 
" (a) Southern Pacific Company, plaintiff 
above nmned, on the date hereof has, located with-
in the limits of Central Weber Sewer Improve-
ment District, or there is apportioned to said dis-
trict for assessment and taxation purposes, the 
following property to wit: 
" ( 1) Trackage 
1.216 miles first main line including 
100 foot right of wa~~. 
1.192 rniles second main line including 
100 foot right of way. 
17.226 miles yard and industrial tracks 
and sidings. 
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"(2) 26.978 miles telephone, telegraph and 
transmission lines. 
" ( 3) Rolling stock consisting of locomotiveR 
and cars apportioned on a baRis of 
19.634 miles. 
" ( 4) Real estate outside of right of way con-
sisting of 99.77 acres of land including 
jointly owned acres. 
" ( 5) Improvements and personal property 
located upon or affixed to the land des-
ignated in the above subparagraph ( 4). 
,. ( 6) Personal property, consisting of ma-
chinery and tools not located upon or 
affixed to the land designated in tlw 
above sub-paragraph ( 4). -
'~(b) Plaintiff, the Southern Pacific Con1-
pany, does not seek to have excluded from said, 
district said 99.77 acres of land nor the im-
provements or personal property located ther'eon. 
Plaintiff, Southern Pacific Company, seeks to 
have excluded from said district all of the other 
property above described. 
" (c) None of the property of plaintiff, South-
ern Pacific Company, designated in sub-para-
graphs (1), (2), (3), and (6) and sought to be 
exc-luded fron1 said district in this action is 
presently physically connected to any sewage 
facilities, and in the conduct of plaintiff's railroad 
operations, it is not desirable or feasibl'e to make 
a physical connection of any ~mch property to any 
sewage facilitieR. r[,hat in the ordinary and 
regular operation of the railroad transportation 
busine~~ the rights of way, rolling stock and 
other equipment are used in connection and in 
conjunetion with the property which plaintiff 
concedes may remain within the district." 
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No. 8176. ~I ountain Fuel Supply Cmnpany Case: 
"3. If L. C. Peschel "'ere called hy the plain-
tiff and sworn in this case, he would testify as 
follows: 
"(a) That Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 
plaintiff above nmned, on the date hereof ha~, 
located within the limits of the Central Weber 
Sewer Improvement Distric-t, or there is appor-
tion'ed to said district for assess1nent and taxation 
purposes, the following property, to-wit: 
" ( 1) Transmission 1nains. 
"(2) Cla~R I distribution properties. 
"(3) Class II distrihution properties. 
"( 4) Class IV distribution propertieR. 
" ( 5) Real estate. 
" ( 6) Improvements. 
"(7) Personal property son1e of which is 
located or affixed to the land desig-
nated in sub-paragraph (5) and some i~ 
not located or affixed to the land desig-
nated in said sub-paragraph (5 ). 
"(b) That Class I distribution propertie~ 
are distribution properties located within said 
district and within cities or towns other than the 
city of Ogden, Utah. Class II distribution prop-
·erties are properties located within said district 
in county areas outside of cities and towns. Class 
IV distribution properties are distribution prop-
erties located within said distric-t within the 
corporate limits of Ogden City, Utah. 
"(c) That plaintiff, the Mountain Fuel Sup-
ply Company, does not seek to have eliminated 
from said district the property designated in 
sub-paragraphs numbered (5), (6) and (7). Plain-
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tiff does seek to have elminated hy this action 
from said district all other propert~· above des-
cribed. 
" (d) That none of the propert~· of the plain-
tiff, the Mountain Fuel Supply Company, desig-
nated in sub-paragraphs numbered 3. (a) (1), 
(2), (3) and ( 4) and sought to be eliminated from 
said district in this action is presently physically 
connected to any sewage facility, and in the con-
duction of plaintiff's operations it is not desirable 
or feasible to make a physical connection of any 
such property to any sewage facilities. That in 
the ordinary and regular operation of the plain-
tiff's business the gas transmission mains and 
gas distribution properties, consisting of gas 
distribution mains, gas service lines, meters, 
regulators and accessories and appurtenances 
thereto and rights of way and easements therefor 
which are the properties referred to above in sub-
paragraph 3 (a) (1), (2), (3), and (4) are used 
in connection and in conjunction with property 
which plaintiff concedes may remain in the dis-
trict.''' 
NTATE~IENT OF POINTN 
This appeal is made upon the entire record in said 
cause• and upon the following points: 
1. Refusal of the Court to grant Defendants' l\Totion 
to Dismiss. 
~. Refusal of tlw Court to grant Defendants' ~[otion 
to Strike. 
3. Error of tl!P ( ~ourt in overruling Defendants' 
Objection to the Introduction of any Evidence 
and OhjPdion to Introduction of Evidence In-
cluded Within Stipulation of Facts. 
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4. Error of the Court in denying Defendants' Motion 
for J udg1nent on the Pleadings. 
5. Error of the Court in entering Judgment in 
favor of Plaintiffs-and-Petitioners and against 
Defendants-and-Respondent~. 
6. Insufficiency of the (\Vidence to justify the .J nrlg-
nlent. 
7. That the .Judginent was contrary to law. 
8. Errors in law. 
ARGU~[ENT 
Point 3: ERROR OF rrHE· COUR~r IN OVERRULING 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIO~ TO THE IN-
TRODUCTION OF ANY EVIDENCE AND 
OBJECTION TO INTRODU( 1TION OF E¥I-
DENCE INCLUDED WITHIN STIPU-
LATION OF FACTS. 
Point 4: ERROR OF THE COUR'l., IN DENYING 
DJ1JFENDANTS' :MOTION FOR .JUDGMENT 
ON THE PLEADINGS. 
Point 5: ERROR OF THE COURT IN ENTERING 
.JUDG?\[ENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS-
AND-PE1TITIONERS AND AGAINST DE-
FENDANTS-AND-RESPONDENTS. 
For clarity of argument we discuss the points set 
forth in our State1nent of Points out of their numerical 
sequence. 
The foregoing points ( 3, 4 and 5) will be discussed 
together for the rea~wn that they are so closely related. 
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The question is whether the proceedings before the 
lower court was a review of the record made before the 
Board of County Commissioners at th'e public hearing 
at the time the District was created or whether it was 
a trial de novo. 
Appellants contend that the proceedings in the 
lower court were for review only and that th'e intro-
duction and admission of new evidence-by stipulation 
or otherwise-was error. Appellants call attention to 
paragraph 2 of the stipulation which provided as fol-
lows: 
··2. This stipulation shall he without preju-
dice to the right of defendants to object to thr 
materiality of any fact set forth in paragraphs 
numbered 3, 4 and 5 hereof or the relevancy of 
any such fact to any issue involved in this case, 
and defendants expressly reserve the right to 
interpose any such objection at the time this 
stipulation is offered and tendered for filing in 
this case." 
Appellants ohjertrd to the introduction of any 
evidence and ob;jectPd to the introduction of the evidence 
included within the stipulation. rrhe objections were 
overruled hy the court and (based in part thereon) 
judgment was entered against the appellants. 
Appellants assigned this as rrror. 
vVe call the Court's attention to Laws of Utah, 
1951, Chapter 32, RPdion 3, which provides in part as 
follows: 
"* * * In such resolution establishing such Dis-
trict, the Board of County Commissioners shall 
eliminate from said proposed District any prop-
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erty originally incorporated therein hnt which 
it shall detennine will not be directly benefited 
by the proposed improvements. Any property 
owner who shall have fil'ed a written protr~t, as 
he;reinbefore provided, and whose property has 
been included, notwithstanding such protest, may 
within (30) thirty days after the adoption of the 
resolution establishing such District, apply to 
the District Court of the Judicial District in 
which such County is located for a nr rit of Re-
1:ieu· of the actions of the Board of Countv 
Commissioners in so establishing such Distrirt, 
but only upon the grounds that his property will 
not be directly benefited by thr propsed improvr-
ments. * * *" (Italics ours.) 
It will he noted that specifir referenre i~ made in 
the foregoing law to "Writ of Review". We call at-
tention to Section 104-67-1, Utah Code Annotated, 194R, 
which states as follow~: 
"The Writ of Certiorori may be designated the 
Writ of Review." 
Subsequently thereto, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
were adopted to take effert .January 1, 1950; anrl Rule 
65B (b) states a~ follows: 
"Grounds For Relief. Appropriate relief may 
be granted: * * * (2) Where an inferior tribunal, 
board, or officer exercising judicial functions 
has exceeded its jurisdictions or abused its dis-
cretion; * * * ." 
Rule 65 B (e), among other things, provides as follows: 
"The review by the Court issuing the Writ shall 
not be extended further than to determine whether 
the inferior tribunal, board, or officer has regu-
larly pursued the authority of such tribunal, 
board, or officer." 
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\Vhile no formality a~ to hearing is designated, it 
would appear tlJat the respondents were afforded an 
opportunity to appear and be heard upon their pro-
tests. They should have introduced before the Board 
of County Conm1issioners such evidence as they de-
sired, and could have there requested that the entire 
proceedings he reported. They did not do so. As a 
matter of fact, they could likewise have requested that 
the Board of County Commissioners stipulate the facts 
in much the same manner as was done in the lower 
court. 
Not having made any such record, there was nothing 
hefore the lower court and there is now nothing before 
this court except the record of proceedings had before 
the Board of County Commissioners in connection with 
the creation of the District. This would seem to have 
been respondents' own them·~· at the time they filed the 
proceedings in the lower Court. As an example, the 
prayPr of Southern Pacific Company, et al (Case No. 
8175), reads as follows: 
"WHEREFORE, applicants pray that this 
court issue its Writ of Review directed to said 
defendants, and each of them, requiring said 
defendants, within the time specified in said 
Writ, to prepare and certify to this court a com-
plete record of all proceedings had in connection 
with the creation of said District; that upon the 
return of said Writ, with said record duly certi-
fied and the proceedings had herein, a judgment 
and decree he entered * * * ." 
It occurs to us that that prayer contemplates what 
the Jaw eontPmplatPs, simply a review of whatever 
27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
record waH 1nade before tlw Board of County Cmnmis-
sioners. We do not see anywhere in it a request for 
a trial de novo. The trial de novo semns to have been 
an afterthought of respondents since the filing of thr 
protests and since the cmnmence1nent of these actions. 
We submit that paragraph 4 of the resolution passed 
by the Board of County Cmnmissioners as set out 
herein is a finding which the County Commissioner~" 
made and is legally sufficient. The case of 
Tygesen v. Magna Water Works Co. 266 P. 2rl127 
holds that there is no distinction between the creation 
of a Metropolitan Water District in the District Court 
and the creation of an In1provement District by the 
County CmnmissionerH. Both were the agencies desig-
nated hy the legislature through which thf' Districts 
could be created. lt was pointed out that once the 
initiating agency had acted, its functions ceased and thr 
governing body of the District assmned control. We see 
no distinction between the action of the court on the 
one hand and the Board of County Commissioners on 
the other, as it related to the formality of creating the 
District. Both, in performing the duties outlined by 
law, were performing judicial functions in creating said 
Districts in each instance. We believe that respondents 
are entitled to a review of the actions of the Board of 
County Commissioners, hut that the review should be 
limited to the recerd 1nade before that Board and only 
to determine "whether the Board has regularly pursued 
the authority of such board." 
It was held in the case of Higgs vs. Burton, 197 P. 
728 that: 
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"The courts are entirelv unanimous in holding 
that in certiorari proce~dings, the records certi-
fied up, by the court, board, or tribunal to whom 
it is directed, i1nports absolute verity, and can-
not be contradicted or supported hy evidenc<' 
dehors the record." 
That the requirement of due process of law is met, 
is fully answered in 
Tygesen v. 2\[agna Water Works Co., supra, 
beginning with headnote (11) page 132. 
On the state of the record before it, the lower Court 
had no evidence upon which it could do otherwise than 
affirm and uphold the ac-tions of the Board of County 
Commissioners; and hence it was error for the lower 
Court to deny appellants' ::\lotions for Judgment on the 
Pleadings and to enter judgn1ents in favor of the re-
spondents and against the appellants. 
Po~t 1: REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO GRANT 
DEFENDANTS' ;\lOTION TO DISMISS. 
Point 6: INSUF,FICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO 
.JUSTIFY THE JUDG1\IENT. 
Point 7: THAT THE .JUDGl\lENT WAS CONTRARY 
TO LAW. 
Point 8: ERROR~ IN LAW. 
The legislative enactn1ent under consideration pro-
vides for the creation of sewer i1nprovement "districts". 
One of the first things to detPrmine, then, is: 
TT'hat is a "District"? 
Webster's New I nh•rnational Dictionary, second 
edition, unabridged, published by G. & C. Merriam Com-
pany, definPf-1 a •'district" as: 
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"1. The territory under a feudal lord's jurisdir-
tion. Obs. 
"2. A division of territory; a defined portion of 
a state, county, country, town, or city, etc., 
1nade for administrative, electoral, or other 
purposes; as, a Congressional, federal, ju-
dicial, land, 1nilitis, magisterial, or school 
district. 
"* * * 
"4. Loosely, any portion of frrritory; rr.qwn, 
tract. (Italics oius) 
In Words and Phra~Ps, Vol. 13, permanent ~clition, 
page 33, we find this: 
"Webster defines the word 'distriet' as a defined 
portion of the state, and it is so used in the def-
inition of a 'town' as a 'district of certain limits.' 
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Town .of Oconto, 6 
N.W. 607, 50 "\Vis. 189, 36 Am. Rep. 849." 
(Italics ours.) 
See numerous other illustrations of the definition 
of the word "district" in: 
Words & Phrases, Vol. 13, permanent edition, 
pages 28 to and including 38. 
In the case of English v. Smith, 196 A. 781, the 
Supreme Court of Error~ of Connecticut, in 1938, dis-
tinguishes a Board ·of Sewer Commissioners of the 
Town of Milford (held to be employees of the Town) 
from a "commission of a sewer district organized for 
1nunicipal purposes," saying ( p. 783) : 
"the complaint, properly construed, shows 
that the commission was, and remained, both 
under the special act and the public act, ~· * * an 
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official board, instrumentality, and agency of the 
town of Milford, and not of a 'seu·wr district' in. 
the sense of a distinct m1.tnicipality.'' (ItalicR 
ours.) 
In the case of Tygesen v. :Magna Water Works Co., 
Supra, this Court defines a sewer improvement district 
in the following language (p. 131): 
"Since an improvement district created under 
Chap. 24, Laws of Utah 1949 is not a corporation 
but is a separate arm of the government formed 
for p1tblic p1trposes, it does not violate Sec. 5 of 
Art. XI of the Utah State Constitution forbidding 
the creation of corporations for municipal pnr-
poses, hy special law~." (Itaim~ ours.) 
Distrirt mw of ''Area''. 
(~onsistent with the definition of a di~trict, the legis-
lahue of the State of Utah, in the enacbnent of the 
Rtatutes under 'vhich the Central Weber Sewer Improve-
ment District was created (Chapter 24, Laws of Utah, 
1949, p. 43, et seq., as amended hy Chapter 32, Laws of 
Ftah, 1951, p. 7~, et seq.) defined the area of such dis-
tricts, fixed the Inethod for establishing the boundaries 
of the districts, and designated the "]Jroperty" to be in-
cluded therein or excluded therefrom as ''real property". 
'ehe 1951 enactment ( ( )hapter 32, Laws of Utah, 
1951) uses the single word "property" in the title to the 
act in ~u(·h a manner that there can he no question but 
that it means real propert~, onl~', because objections can 
he made only hy "rPal property" owners, and yet those 
real property owners were designated hy the single word 
"property" ownPrR in that title. We flUOte: 
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"An Act An1ending Section 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 and 11, 
Chapter 24, Laws of Utah 1949, Enabling Impove-
ment Districts to Include Incorporated :Municipal-
ities and Areas, Providing for Objections hy More 
Than Twenty-five Per Cent in Number of Prop-
erty Owners, for Appointment of Board of Trus-
tees for Sewer Districts Including a Combination 
of Two or More :Municipalities or Other Areas, 
Ti1ne Limit for ::\Iaturity of Bonds, and for the 
Powers of Improvement District." (Italics ours.) 
In analyzing the entire legislation on this subject 
it is apparent that the real intent of the legislature all 
the way through was to establish sewer districts as a 
''defined portion of the state", with geographical bound-
aries, encmnpassing, like a municipality, certain defined 
areas . 
. Area. 
In quoting the title to the 1951 act, supra, we ital-
icized the word "area" as well as the word "property". 
In addition to that use of the word "area (which in and 
of itself would see1n to define a sewer district by "area" 
only) attention is called to the fact that all through the 
legislation the word "area" or its equivalent is used, and 
nowhere in the legiEilation do we observe the words 
"personal property" used. 
For illustration, we quote from Section 1 of the 1951 
law (Chapter 32~ Laws of Utah, 1951): 
"Section 1. Improveme~t District-Area of. 
" * * * * * * * 
"The area of any district created hereunder may 
include all or part of any county or counties in-
cluding all or any part of any incorporated munic-
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ipalities, other incorporated areas, and unin-
corporated areas, as the needs of the inhabitants 
of the proposed districts may appear. Districts 
of the same kind :-;hall not overlap." (Italics ours.) 
Section 2 of the same statute, not only uses the word 
"area" or ''area~" hut say~ that the resolution creating 
the district shall : 
"define the boundaries thereof * * * ." 
and goc>:-; on to speak of : 
"25% or more of the owners of real property in 
clu,ded within the proposed district * * * ." 
and then speaks of ''part:·/' of other counties and areas in 
the following language: 
"In the event the proposed district includes any 
part of another county or counties, the above 
resolution shall further state the name or names 
of the other rounty or counties and the areas 
within such other county or counties proposed to 
be incruded within such district." (Italics ours.) 
Section 3 of that same statute provides for the notice of 
intention to establish a proposed distrid: 
''* * * which notice shall define the area to be in-
cluded therein and the boundaries thereof, * * * " 
(Italics ours.) 
and goes on to provide that if: 
"written protest shall be filed, signed by 1nore 
than twenty-five percent (25%) in number of the 
real property owners within said proposed dis-
trict, according to the last assessment roll for 
county taxes completed prior to the publishing 
of the notice, the district ~hall not he established." 
(Italics ours.) 
Nowhere in the act is anything said about including 
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personal property in the distrirt. In fact, the only thing 
that is discussed in the act as being included is real pro]J-
erty. Then when that smne statute goes on to ~ay what 
shall be elim.inated under r~rtain specified conditions, in 
the following language : 
"In such resolution establishing such district, thr 
board of County Commissioners shall eliminate 
from said proposed district any property origin-
ally inclttded therein, but which it shall determine 
will not be directly benefited hy the proposed im-
provements." 
it can only 1nean what it ~ay~. that the property whirh 
1night he PliminafPd, und~r the conditions specified, i~ 
any of the property which was ori.rtinally included in the 
proposed distrirt. And the only property which was in-
cluded in the proposed distrirt was real ]Jroperty; and 
hence nothing but real property could he eliminated from 
the district or could have been Pliminatrd from the pro-
posed district in the first instance on the protest of the 
respondents. 
This is emphasized hy tlw following language from 
that same Section 3 : 
"Any property owner who shall have filed a 
written protest, as hereinbefore provided, and 
whose ]Jroperty has been included, notwithstand-
ing such protest, may within ( 30) thirty days 
after the adoption of the resolution establishing 
such district, apply to the district court of the 
judicial district in which such county is located 
for a writ of review of the actions of the Board of 
County Commissioners in so establishing such 
district, but only upon the ground that his prop-
erty will not be directly benefited by the proposed 
improvements ... " (Italics ours.) 
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In that language the ~ingle word "property" could only 
refer to real property, because only real property 
was included in the district. And, as elsewhere in this 
brief argued, the provision with respect to direct benefit 
refers only to real property within the district which 
lies in such a position that a sewage system could carry 
away the enstomary waste products. 
Elsewhere in the legislation similar references and 
usages of terms are found, all, in our opinion, referring 
to real property and real property only. 
A contrary view results in absurdities. A sewage 
district, organized and bounded as provided by these 
statutes, being a defined portion of the State, encmn-
passes and includes everything within the confines of its 
boundaries. And once established and bounded it be-
comes fixed, and everything in it is taxable in like man-
ner to the general taxation of property in any other 
defined portion of the state. To say that personal 
property within the district is not within the district 
is certainly an anomaly of rare complexion. 
Differently put, it occurs to us that what respondents 
are contending for in this case is not that their personal 
property is not within or a part of the district, hut that 
it should not be taxahle hy the district. There is a tre-
mendous difference. Respondents have endeavored to 
get certain of their properties excluded from taxation 
when they should, perhaps, have heen endeavoring to get 
certain of their real property excluded from the district. 
Provision is mane in the law for getting real property 
eliminated from the district. But we find no provision 
for getting personal or other property eliminated (or 
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. excluded) fron1 taxation, when and if it is within tlw 
district. 
We contend that respondents, having left all their 
real property in the district hy failing to take the proper 
steps to get it excluded hy delineation of area or bound-
ary from the district itself, still seek to get certain of 
that real and personal property excluded frmn taxation 
while still ad1nitting that it is within the district. Or, in 
answer to this statmnent, they may say that they want 
the court to exclude it frmn the district hy decree, placing 
it in a state of some type of suspended animation or 
lifting it up above the district and there suspending it, 
free frmn taxation. \Ve submit that this cannot be done. 
Their properties are within the boundaries of the dis-
trict, and that being so, they must be taxed generally as 
all other properties are taxed. No legislative, judicial, 
tax commision, or other recognized classification exists 
for freeing properties lying within a sewer district from 
taxation by the district. Plaintiffs' remedy, if any, was 
to have the boundaries of the district so fixed (after 
proper protest to that effect) that those boundaries did 
not include their properties, if any. not directly benefit-
ted by the sewer district. 
General Taxation; not special assessment: 
On the question of taxation, the distinction between 
general and special in1provement taxes n1ust be made, in-
asmuch as the benefits which are the basis of special 
assessments have no place in the consideration of a 
general tax. The taxes imposed hy the Sewer Improve-
ment District are general taxes. 
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In Tygesen vs. ~Iagna vVater vVorks Co., supra, at 
page 132, this court said: 
"At the outset it should be kept in mind that 
this act was enacted to provide for the creation of 
Improvement Districts wherever desired in the 
State, and that these Districts, when formed, are 
quasi-municipalities, and the benefits to be ob-
tained from such Districts enure to the public 
generally. There are no provisions in the act for 
special assessments or liabilities of individuals 
for benefits which would enure to them as such, 
but merely as members of the public. The taxes 
which the Act empowers the District to levy for 
the payment of the benefits are general taxes, and 
not special assesments." 
This distinction is like\\·i~e pointed out in Lehi Cit~· 
v~. -:\Ieiling, 48 P. 2d ;)~7: 
"The supplying of water for domestic uses 
within municipalities has grown of recent years 
to be one of the most common and well-recognized 
forms of municipal activities wherein public prop-
erty is employed and wherein public taxation is 
imposed and collected upon the inhabitants of the 
municipalities regardless of the benefits conferred 
upon particular property, and by the same method 
by which taxes are generally levied and collected 
for the carrying on of the governmental functions 
of incorporated cities and towns ... 
" ... Nor can we discover any rational theory 
upon which, in the levy and collection of such 
taxes, the powers of either shaH be limited hy 
those rules which have been given application in 
the formation of that class of public agencies 
wherein the assessments imposed upon a par-
ticular property have such direct reference to 
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benefits conferred as to require notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing to be given to the owners of 
the property to he affected by the a~~<'~smenh; 
thus to he in1posed ... " (Italics ours.) 
As pointed out hy Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 1, 4th 
Edition, page 214: 
"Taxes proper, or general taxes, it has heen 
said 'proceed upon the theory that the existenr<' 
of government is a necessity; that it cannot con-
tinue without means to pay its expenses; that for 
those means it has the right to cmnpel all ritizens 
and propert~· within it~ limits to contribute; and 
that for such contribution, it renders no return 
of special benefit to any property, hut only secure~ 
to the citizen that general benefit which result~ 
frmn protection to his person and property, and 
the promotion of those various schemes whic·h 
have for their object the welfare of all.' That 
this is the correct theory is beyond douht, hut 
nevertheless the contention has often been pre-
sented that property receiving no direct benefit 
from a tax for a particular purpose should not he 
taxed for such purpose. However, it is almost un-
animously held that it is no defense to the collec-
tion of a tax for a special purpose that a person 
liable for the tax is not benefited hy the expend-
iture of the proceeds of the tax or not as much 
benefited as others. For instanre, every citizen 
is bound to P•lY his portion of a school tax al-
though he has no children, or is not a resident, 
and this also applies to corporations; of a police 
or fire tax, although he has no buildings or 
personal property; or of a road tax although he 
never used the road. In other tcords, a general 
tax cannot be dissected to show that, as to certain 
constifupnf parts. the taxpayPr recei1.·ps n.o benP-
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fits. So property within the lin1it~ of a Jnunici-
pality is subject to local taxation although it 
derives little or no benefit from the municipal 
government. This rule is often applied to the 
taxation for special purposes of agricultural lands 
situated within the corporate limits of cities. If 
such property was exempted, the provision of the 
constitution requiring taxes to be eq~tal and 
uniform would be violated." (Italics ours.) 
It has bePn stipulated by the appellants and respond-
ents that there is a general benefit to all persons situated 
within the boundaries of the District. 
In the case of _Morton Salt Company vs. City of 
South Hutchinson, 159 F. 2d 897 the rrenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals discussed a situation in which the plaintiff 
complained that the water works proposed terminated 
three-quarters of a mile from the plaintiff's property, 
and that they should he freed from the tax_. In that case, 
it did not appear that the Supreme Court of Kansas had 
declared the tax from which the plaintiff sought to be 
excluded, a general tax, hut the Fedeal Court pointed 
out at page 900 that: 
''It is no constitutional defense to a tax that 
the taxpayer is not directly benefited thereby, or 
is less benefited than others who pay the same or 
less tax ... " 
rrhe Federal Court in that case cited Cooley, from 
whom we have just quoted, and said further, at page 901: 
''The authorities sometimes draw a distinc-
tion between a general ad valorpm tax levied for 
the general welfare of the whole community, and 
a tax in the form of an assessment to finance 
speeial improvements designed to benefit tlH• 
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property located within a particular taxing jnriR-
diction." 
The sa1ne court at page 902 said : 
"We may take judicial notice, even in the face 
of the complaint, that the proposed waterworkR 
system would redound to the benefit of the whole 
community, in virtue of its contribution to the 
health, safety~ morals, and general welfare there-
of, and that all of the property and people in-
cluded within the City would be either directly or 
indirectly benefited thereby." (Italics ours.) 
Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 1. 4th Edition, page 648, 
statPf': 
"In case of specially created taxing districts, 
the same rule prevails. If the boundaries are des-
ignated l)y the legislature, such designation is 
final and cannot be reviewed hy the rourts unless 
in exceptional cases. One whose property is within 
the boundaries of the district cannot attack the 
tax on the ground that his property is not bene-
fited by the tax and should not have heen in-
cluded within the taxing district." 
Since the tax i1nposed is a general one, where the 
receipt of benefits is not a factor, the only method of 
escaping the tax is through an area exclusion. This 
Inethod is effective, because at the inception the district 
had only provisional houndaries from which the County 
Commissioners were obligated to exclude the property 
not directly benefited. Once the boundaries of the dis-
trict had been established, all property included within 
the limits of the district were subject to the general tax, 
and the respondents' failing to request an area exclusion, 
and their failing to make a record upon which the County 
Commissioners rould make an area exclusion, they Inust 
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be subject to the general tax, whether or not they are 
directly benefited by the proposed improvements. 
The :Morton Salt decision, last above cited, expressly 
holds that any tax levied and imposed for the purpose 
of supplying capital for municipalities or quasi-munici-
palities is not to he regarded as a special tax or assess-
ment but is a general tax levied just as, and for the same 
purpose, that any general municipal tax is imposed, for 
carrying on the governmental functions or utilitarian 
objects of any duly incorporated cities or towns. 
Point 2: REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO GRANT 
DEFENDANTS' 1fOrriON TO STRIKE. 
Reference is made to paragraph .J. of the stipulation 
of facts on file applicable to all of the pending cases. 
lt is therein stated that the word "directly" was added 
to the law for the fir~t time in 1951. While appellants 
contend that the addition of the word "directly'' neither 
adds to nor detracts from the overall meaning of the 
law as it relates to a general tax, yet it is interesting to 
trace the statutory enaetments from the very beginning 
to the present time. 
Chapter 25, Laws of Utah, 10..J:7, Section 3, passed 
:.\[arch 13, 1947, and in effect May 13, 1947, provided in 
part as follows : 
"At such tin1e the Board of County Commission-
ers shall hear the petitioner and all protests and 
objections to the same ... On the final hearing 
the Board of County Commissioners shall make 
such changes in the proposed boundaries as may 
be deemed advisable, and shall define and estab-
lish such boundaries ... " (Italics ours.) 
No reference was made to any exelusion of property. 
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Chapter 24, Law~ of Utah, 1949, passed l\[arrh 8, 
1949, and in effect ~lay 18, 1949, repealed Chapter 25, 
Laws of Utah, 1947. Section 3 of that art provided as 
follows, in part: 
"In such resolution establishing such district, the 
Board of County Commissioners shall ~liminatr 
from said proposed district any property origin-
ally included therein, but which it shall determine 
will not be benef#ed hy the proposed improve-
ments ... " (Italics ours.) 
The law under which the Central Weber Sew~r 
Improvement District wa~ organized is Chapter 32, Laws 
of Utah, 1951, passed February 13, 1951, and became 
effective May 8, 1951. Section 3 provided in part as 
follows: 
" ... originally included therein, hut which it 
shall determine will not be directly benefited .. " 
(Italics ours.) 
The present law, Chapter 29, Laws of Utah, 1953, 
(Section 17-6-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) passed 
March 12, 1953, and in effect :March 24, 1953, provided in 
part as follows : 
'' ... Originally included therein, but which it 
shall determine will not be benefited by the ... " 
(Italics ours) 
What the legislature intended by adding the word 
"directly" into the law in 1951 was to set up a formula 
under which the owners of real property in an area 
which could not be reached by the sewer system in the 
sewer district, or which might be lower in altitude so 
as to be impossible of drainage by a proposed sewer 
system, could protest such of their real property areas 
out of the boundaries of the proposed district. It evi-
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dently was then felt that it would be easier for an owner 
to protest such portions of his property out of a pro-
posed district if the act used the words "directly bene-
fited" rather than the word "benefited." We urge that 
for such purposes and for such purpose only, the word 
"directly" has a meaning which is consistent with the 
intent of the legislature. Otherwise it does violence to 
the entire act, the provisions of which are not subject 
to any other reasonable interpretation. 
At this point, respondents Inight inquire as to why, 
then, the legislature had deleted the word "directly" in 
subsequent legislation. And we believe the answer is 
that it recognized its error in changing the 1949 enact-
ment by adding that word in the 1951 legislation, and 
deleted it in the 1953 legislation, because it was unneces-
sary to have the word "directly" preceding the word 
"benefited" if the area sought to be protested out could 
not in fact be benefited because of its physical position 
beyond or belo\v the drainage of the proposed sewer 
:-;ystem. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we submit that in each of the above-
entitled actions the judgments of the lower Court should 
be reversed, and the complaints and petitions of the 
several plaintiffs for review should be denied; and we 
submit that the action of the Board of County Com-
missioners of Weber County in including all of the prop-
P,rty involved in these cases within the District, should 
1e upheld and affir1ned. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALLACE, ADAMS & PETERSON 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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